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NOTES
IS THERE A CEILING CAP ON YOUR
HEALTH CARE? LIFE AFTER DOE V.
MUTUAL OF OMAHA
Maura K. Frickel*
INTRODUCTION
Two individuals hold health insurance policies with the same insurance
company. The same two individuals catch pneumonia, see a doctor for
treatment, and submit their claims to the insurance company for payment.
One of the individuals receives payment on his claim. The second
individual receives a denial of his claim stating that he has exhausted his
$25,000 lifetime payment cap. The second individual is infected with the
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and, as a result, his
insurance company has placed an artificially low lifetime cap on his policy
for the treatment of AIDS and any AIDS related condition (ARC).
AIDS, by its definition, is a debilitation of the immune system caused by
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), thus making common ailments
ARCs. The second individual is forced to forgo state-of-the-art, life-
sustaining medical treatment because his insurance company will not
cover the treatment.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently
handed down a troubling opinion. In Doe v. Mutual of Omaha, the
divided court ruled that the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)1 does
not apply to the content of insurance policies. The Seventh Circuit held
that the ADA does not prohibit a business from offering a disabled
person inferior services so long as that business does not exclude disabled
persons altogether.3 In the words of the court, "[the ADA] does not
require a seller to alter his product to make it equally valuable to the
* J.D. Candidate 2001, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of
America; B.A. 1998 The Catholic University of America. The author wishes to
thank her parents, Don and Mary Jo Frickel, for their continued help and
encouragement.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (1994).
2. Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999).
3. Id. at 563.
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disabled and to the non-disabled. 4  The appellant petitioned for a
rehearing en banc and was denied by a six to five vote of the active
members of the court The final decision of the court was appealed to the
Supreme Court and in early 2000 the Court declined to review the case.'
A brief examination is warranted to better understand the impact this
decision had and will continue to have on persons with AIDS. The
foundational purposes for the introduction and passage of the ADA merit
explanation to provide an understanding of the statute and its purported
goals. In 1986, the National Council on Disability (NCD)7 issued a report
examining incentives and disincentives for increasing the independence
and full integration of people with disabilities into our society.8 The
Council concluded there was insufficient civil rights coverage for people
with disabilities. 9 Although great strides toward the integration of racial
and ethnic minorities had been made in recent decades, 0 civil rights for
the disabled were not being actively protected. The report clearly
4. Id.
5. Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 18360 (Hon. Joel
T. Flaum, Hon. Kenneth F. Ripple, Hon. Ilana Diamond Rovner, Hon. Diane P.
Wood and Hon. Terrence T. Evans voted to grant the petition for rehearing en
banc. There are 11 active members of the court).
6. Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., - U.S. _, 120 S. Ct. 845 (2000).
7. The National Council on Disability (NCD) is an independent federal
agency making recommendations to the President and Congress on issues
affecting 54 million Americans with disabilities. NCD is composed of fifteen
members appointed by the President and confirmed by the U.S. Senate. NCD's
overall purpose is to promote policies, programs, practices, and procedures that
guarantee equal opportunity for all individuals with disabilities, regardless of the
nature or severity of the disability; and to empower individuals with disabilities to
achieve economic self-sufficiency, independent living, and inclusion and
integration into all aspects of society, at http://www.ncd.gov (last visited Feb. 19,
2000).
8. National Council on Disability, Toward Independence (Washington, D.C.
1986).
9. Id.
10. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (Supp. IV
1999) (establishing comprehensive programs of vocational rehabilitation and
independent living, prohibiting discrimination in employment by the federal
government's executive branch and requiring affirmative action in hiring people
with disabilities by federal agencies and contractors); see also, Education of All
Handicapped Children Act of 1974, amended by, 20 U.S.C. § 1401 et. seq. (Supp.
IV 1999) (mandating an end to separate and unequal educational opportunities by
requiring that all children with disabilities be afforded a free, appropriate public
education); The Fair Housing Act of 1968, amended by, Pub. L. No. 100-430
(amended in 1988 to add protection for people with disabilities).
Doe v. Mutual of Omaha
articulated a critical need for far-reaching civil rights legislation for
disabled persons. As a result, the ADA was signed into law by President
George Bush in July of 1990 for the express purpose of combating
discrimination against disabled persons. Its stated goal was to ban
discrimination in the areas of employment, public accommodation, public
services, transportation, and telecommunications.11 To the credit of the
NCD and others involved in the promulgation and enactment of the
ADA, the statute has been implemented and proven effective in a whole
host of scenarios battling discrimination against the disabled. As Doe
exemplifies, however, the statute has yet to be interpreted to the fullest
extent of its intended purpose.
Doe involves two plaintiffs, identified as "John Doe" and "Richard
12Smith," both infected with HIV . Doe and Smith each held insurance
policies of differing values with Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company
(Mutual of Omaha). Mutual of Omaha placed a lifetime maximum claim
cap of $100,000 and $25,000 respectively for Doe and Smith for HIV-
related care. By contrast, the company offers lifetime ceiling caps of $1
million for cancer, heart disease and most other serious illnesses.
Moreover, Mutual provided additional coverage above and beyond the $1
million cap if the holder made no new claim for two consecutive years,
another benefit not available to Doe and Smith. Doe and Smith sued
Mutual of Omaha claiming that HIV was a disability and that the
artificially-low caps amounted to impermissible discrimination under the
ADA.
13
The landmark 1998 Supreme Court decision of Bragdon v. Abbott
14
marked the first recognition of asymptomatic HIV as a disability under
the ADA. The Court stated "HIV infection satisfies the statutory and
regulatory definition of a physical impairment during every stage of the
disease."' 5  Notably, the Bragdon Court held: (1) asymptomatic HIV
disease constitutes a physical impairment from the moment of infection;"
(2) reproduction is considered a major life activity for the purposes of the
ADA;17 and (3) HIV substantially limits an infected person's ability to
11. National Council on Disability, Toward Independence (Washington, D.C.
1986).
12. For the purposes of this note, the terms HIV and AIDS will be used
interchangeably and should be construed to have the same meaning.
13. Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557,563 (7th Cir. 1999).
14. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
15. Id. at 637.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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reproduce. 8 Collectively, the Court concluded HIV, and subsequently
AIDS, are disabilities under the ADA.' 9
This Note will address the Seventh Circuit opinion in Doe and the
implications of this decision for persons living with AIDS. The case itself
touches upon a host of issues, primarily involving statutory interpretation
of the ADA. Specifically, four aspects of interpretation will be discussed.
Part I addresses the prior case law dealing with whether the protections of
the ADA extend to and regulate the content of insurance policies. Part II
discusses the unsound affect of the Doe decision with several subsections
addressing the component parts of the opinion. Subsection A speaks to
the amount of deference that should be given to an administrative
agency's interpretation of Congressionally enacted statutes. Subsection B
analyzes the application of the "safe harbor" provision of Title IV of the
ADA when invoked by an insurance company. Subsection C examines
the function of the McCarran-Ferguson Act as it relates to the
interpretation and implementation of the ADA. The sum of the
aforementioned analysis leads to the ultimate conclusion that the Seventh
Circuit erred in its holding in the Doe case. The proper interpretation of
the ADA mandates zero-tolerance of discrimination against disabled
persons. The ADA is designed to protect against discriminatory behavior
provided the target of such behavior meets the statutory definition of
disabled. Doe and Smith satisfactorily met the definition of disabled and
Mutual of Omaha engaged in discriminatory conduct. It is this scenario
precisely that the ADA was enacted to protect against.
I. PRIOR CASE LAW - PRECEDENTIAL VALUE OR
DISTINGUISHABLE?
There is scant prior case law in any jurisdiction that paralleled the
question presented to the district court in the Northern District of Illinois
and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The district court opinion
recognized the threshold issue as one of first impression.2 0 As framed by
the district court, the question presented was whether or not the ADA's
Title III prohibition against unlawful discrimination extends to the
content of insurance policies offered directly by an insurance company to
an insured." Title III bars discrimination against any disabled person in
the "full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
18. Id. at 639.
19. Id.
20. Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 999 F. Supp. 1188, 1191 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
21. Id. at 1191.
Doe v. Mutual of Omaha
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation. , 2
At the district court level, each party relied on two distinct sets of cases.
Mutual of Omaha relied heavily on a set of cases that narrowly interpret
the scope of Title III, but never reach the issue presented in Doe.
Whereas, the plaintiffs offered the court contrasting precedent that
broadly interprets Title III as applicable to the content of insurance
policies. Mutual of Omaha relied on Parker v. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co.,23 and Leonard F. v. Israel Discount Bank of New York.24 In
Parker, the Sixth Circuit addressed whether Title III of the ADA
prohibits an employer from providing a long-term disability plan that
distinguishes between mental and physical disorders in the amount of
available benefits. 21 Ouida Sue Parker, the disabled plaintiff, was plagued
with severe depression." Schering-Plough Health Care Products, Inc.
(Schering-Plough), Parker's employer, offered a long-term disability plan
to its employees, which was issued by Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company (MetLife).27 The plan offered diminished care for mentally
disabled persons as compared to the care offered to physically disabled
persons. Policyholders prevented from working due to mental
incapacitation were limited to a benefits period of twenty-four months,
while benefits to the physically incapacitated policyholder were valid from
28the time of disability until age sixty-five. Parker challenged the long-
term disability plan because it offered substantially less benefits to
mentally disabled persons than it did to physically disabled persons. 9 The
Sixth Circuit held that "[t]he provision of a long-term disability plan by an
employer does not fall within the purview of Title III."'3  The court
further explained the difference between accessing an insurance policy
vis-A-vis the company's office of business as opposed to accessing a policy
through an employer.31
The rationale of the court in Parker is noteworthy to distinguish from
Doe. First, when Parker was initially heard by the Sixth Circuit, the panel
ruled that "Title III prohibits discrimination in the contents of the goods
and services offered at places of public accommodation, rather than just
22. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994).
23. 121 F.3d 1006 (6" Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1084 (1998).
24. 967 F. Supp. 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
25. Parker, 121 F.3d at 1008.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1014.
31. Id. at 1011.
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discrimination in terms of physical access to places of public
accommodation."" The court granted a rehearing en banc3 and
concluded that Title III does not prohibit discrimination in a benefit plan
offered by an employer.34 In the words of the court, "while we agree that
an insurance office is a public accommodation as expressly set forth in §
12181(7), plaintiff did not seek the goods and services of an insurance
office. Rather, Parker accessed a benefit plan provided by her private
employer and issued by MetLife."35 The Parker court determined the
benefit plan was not covered under the scope of Title III. However, the
determination was made on an independent basis from that argued by
Mutual of Omaha in Doe. The cases are distinct from one another and
the source from which the insurance policy is provided is the key to
determining whether or not the policy's content is regulated by the ADA.
In Parker, the policy was provided by a private employer," while in Doe
the policy was offered directly by the insurance carrier, the place of public
accommodation." Accordingly, the district court gave little weight to
Parker because the circumstances were distinct from those of Doe.38 The
Seventh Circuit did not address Parker other than to say that its
conclusion is consistent with the Sixth Circuit's conclusion.39
Mutual of Omaha placed equal emphasis on Leonard F. from the
Southern District of New York. The Israel Discount Bank of New York
(the Bank) employed Leonard F. as an Assistant Vice-President.40 The
Bank provided short and long-term disability insurance coverage to
Leonard F. as a benefit of his employment." The insurance plan was
42
offered through MetLife. In 1994, Leonard F. became disabled as a
result of depression, a mental disorder within the terms of the MetLife
• 43
policy. He received short-term disability benefits from the policy, the
32. Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 181, 187 (6th Cir. 1996).
33. Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 107 F.3d 359 (6th Cir. 1997).
34. Parker, 121 F.3d at 1010.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 999 F. Supp. 1188, 1190 (N.D. Ill. 1998);
see also, Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999).
38. See Doe, 999 F. Supp. at 1193 (finding the Parker court's limitation on the
scope of Article III neither controlling nor persuasive).
39. Doe, 179 F.3d at 563 (7th Cir. 1999).
40. Leonard F. v. Israel Discount Bank of New York, 967 F. Supp. 802, 803
(S.D.N.Y. 1997).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
Doe v. Mutual of Omaha
receipt of which was a condition precedent to the eligibility for long-term
disability benefits." Subsequently, Leonard F. applied for and received
long-term benefits covering the same disability for the two-year period of
1994 to 1996.4' However, in 1996 the disability benefits for Leonard F.S 46
were terminated consistent with the MetLife policy. The policy had in
place a long-term disability cap of two years for mental disabilities. 47
Thus, the question presented in the case was virtually identical to the
question in Parker.48 Leonard F. argued that the two-year cap for mental
disorders provided by his employer's disability insurance plan was
discriminatory and violative of the ADA.49 The court concluded that Title
III of the ADA is not applicable to employee benefits.' ° Again, as in
Parker, the decision reached by the court is not analogous to the issue
involved in Doe. Nowhere in the Leonard F opinion does the court say
that if the plaintiff were suing the insurance company, and the policy had
been directly provided by the insurance company, the outcome would be
the same.5 Mutual of Omaha relied heavily on the above-mentioned
cases, yet neither of them were factually consistent with Doe.
The plaintiffs, Doe and Smith, relied on two categorically different
cases as their source of authority." In Chabner v. United Mutual of
Omaha Life Insurance Co.," the plaintiff alleged discrimination under the
ADA because his life insurance policy cost was nearly double the rate
charged to non-disabled individuals during the same period of time.54
Chabner, a thirty-five year old man physically disabled with
fascioscapulohumeral (FSH) muscular dystrophy (MD) and bound to a
wheelchair,55 obtained a policy from United of Omaha costing him $305.44
for one year. 56 By contrast, coverage for a non-smoking man of the same
age without FSH and MD would have cost $155.44 for the same one-year
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 999 F. Supp. 1188,1192 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
49. Leonard F, 967 F. Supp. at 803.
50. Id. at 806.
51. Id. at 803.
52. See generally Chabner v. United Mutual of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 994 F.
Supp. 1185 (N.D. Cal. 1998); World Ins. Co., v. Branch, 966 F. Supp. 1203 (N.D.
Ga. 1997).
53. 994 F. Supp. 1185 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
54. Id. at 1187.
55. Id.
56. Id.
2000]
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• 57
period. The court discarded the insurance company's argument that the
scope of Title III covers only discrimination in the physical access of
58goods and services. Instead, the court interpreted the plain language of
Title III and the legislative history of the statute to extend Title III to the
underwriting practices of insurance companies.5 9 The court reasoned that
but for such an interpretation of Title III, the provision "providing for
equal access to goods and services.... and requiring 'reasonable
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures.., necessary to afford
such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations
to individuals with disabilities' would be rendered superfluous."60 Under
this interpretation, there is no other analysis that could be possible
without rendering the provisions of Title III impotent.
The plaintiffs also relied on World Insurance Co. v. Branch,61 the case
that most closely parallels Doe. Ralph Branch held an insurance policy
with Security General Life Insurance Company (Security General), whose
obligations were later wholly assumed by World Insurance Company.
62
The court framed the issue as "whether an insurer who limits health care
benefits for AIDS-related treatment to a specific amount has engaged in
disability-based discrimination in violation of Title III.,,63 The court's
analysis began with three unyielding conclusions: (1) an individual with
AIDS is indisputably a disabled person under the ADA; 4 (2) as an insurer
whose operations affect commerce, the insurance company is a place of
public accommodation;65 and (3) the scope of Title III of the ADA
extends beyond the mere denial of physical access to places of public
66
accommodation. Having established these three tenets, the court was
left to determine whether the actions of the insurance company werediscriminatory. The opinion quickly noted that the answer to this
question was not found in the plain language of the statute.68
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1191.
59. Id. at 1192.
60. Id. at 1192-93.
61. 966 F. Supp. 1203 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
62. Id. at 1204.
63. Id. at 1207.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1207 (relying on 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(f)).
66. Id. at 1207 (citing Carparts Distribution Center v. Automotive
Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding
that places of public accommodation are not limited to actual physical structures)).
67. 966 F. Supp. at 1207.
68. Id.
Doe v. Mutual of Omaha
The California Court surveyed numerous factors in determining
whether or not Title III prohibitions applied to insurance company
• 69
practices. Other district court opinions dealing with the same or
ancillary issues were looked at first. The court noted that § 12201(c) 70 has
been interpreted as explicitly allowing insurers to draw some disability-
based distinctions and to create certain classifications with respect to
disabilities in insurance policies." The Anderson court stated "it may be
possible to provide certain coverage exclusions to individuals with
disabilities if the risks of those disabilities so warrant and those risks are
treated like other similar risks not associated with disabilities. 7 2  Doe
presented no evidence to suggest that Mutual of Omaha treated insured
persons with terminal diseases or other debilitating disabilities with the
same severe policy caps. Likewise, evidence of similar treatment of like
policy-holders failed to exist in World Ins. Co.. Ultimately, the Anderson
court concluded that the ADA "puts the burden on those actors
classifying risks to show both their rationality and their permissibility.,
73
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois stated this rule
succinctly in Baker v. Hartford Life Ins. Co.74 Based on § 12201(c),75 an
69. Id.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) provides that Title III "shall not be construed to
prohibit or restrict ... an insurer ... from underwriting risks, classifying risks, or
administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State law." 42
U.S.C. § 12201(c) (1994). This section has commonly been referred to as the Safe
Harbor Provision.
71. Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store of Delaware, 924 F. Supp. 763, 779
(E.D. Tex. 1996).
72. Id. at 780.
73. Id. at 779.
74. 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14103 (N.D. Il. 1995).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (1994).
Insurance. Subtitles I through III of this Act shall not be construed to prohibit or
restrict-
(1) an insurer.., or any agent, or entity that administers benefit plans, or
similar organizations from underwriting risks, classifying risks, or
administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State
law; or
(2) a person or organization covered by this Chapter from establishing,
sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit
plan that are based on underwriting risks, classifying risks, or
administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State
law; or
(3) a person or organization covered by this Chapter from establishing,
sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit
plan that is not subject to State laws that regulate insurance. Id.
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insurer may decide not to insure an individual without violating the ADA
if "the decision not to insure constituted underwriting or classifying
risk., 76 Conversely, the court noted the natural inverse of the above when
it stated, "an individual who is disabled may be entitled to recovery under
the ADA if the decision to deny that individual coverage 'was not based
on considerations of underwriting or classifying risks.' 77 The Baker court
focused on one more case, Doukas v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co."
This decision held that "while insurers retain the ability to follow practices
consistent with insurance risk classification accepted under state law,
these methods must still be based on sound actuarial principles or related
to actual or reasonably anticipated experience. 79  In Doe, Mutual of
Omaha conceded it was unable to show that policy caps for holders with
AIDS were consistent with sound actuarial principles, actual or
reasonably anticipated experience, bona fide risk classification or state
law.80
The World Insurance Co. court used all of these cases collectively to
conclude no evidence could explain why the insurance company capped
an insured person's lifetime benefits for AIDS at $5000.81 The court
further noted "that the underwriting risks associated with the treatment of
AIDS cannot be so different from the treatment of innumerable other
disabilities, which are capped under the policy at $2,000,000. '" 2 The lack
of foundation and explanation for such a discrepancy, 400 fold, caused the
World Insurance Co. court to find in favor of the insured and allow
recovery under Title III of the ADA."'
Collectively, the cases cited by Mutual of Omaha and by the plaintiffs,
support the proposition that an insurance carrier/office is a place of public
accommodation within the meaning of the ADA. Further, the insurance
office may exercise their underwriting practices so long as they stay within
the confines of sound actuarial practices of the industry and bona fide
classification risks. Based on the four main cases cited to by both parties
in Doe, the following unmistakable principles can be extracted: In
situations where an insurance policy is issued to an employee through
his/her employer, as was the case in Parker and Leonard F., the
protections of the ADA are not triggered. The employer is viewed as a
76. Baker, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14103 at 9.
77. Id.
78. 950 F. Supp. 422 (D.N.H. 1996).
79. Id. at 432.
80. Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d at 558 (7th Cir. 1999).
81. Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 999 F. Supp. at 1209 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
82. Id. at 1209.
83. Id.
Doe v. Mutual of Omaha
"middle-man" in the arrangement between the insurer and the insured.
In such a situation, it becomes increasingly difficult to classify the
insurance company as a place of public accommodation, since the benefits
received by the insured employee are employment benefits. By contrast,
where the insurance policy is purchased directly from the company, as in
Chabner and World Ins. Co., the insurance company is a place of public
accommodation and cannot discriminate by providing inferior coverage to
individuals with a particular disability, such as HIV, as compared to non-
HIV positive individuals.
In a post-Doe Circuit decision handed down in December of 1999, the
Second Circuit ruled Title III of the ADA does regulate the underwriting
practices of insurance companies.8" In Pallozzi v. Allstate Ins. Co., the
court reasoned that Title III's mandate that disabled persons be afforded
the "full and equal enjoyment of the goods, and services.., of any place
of public accommodation, 85 suggested that the statute intended to
guarantee disabled persons more than physical access.86 To conclude
otherwise, as did the Seventh Circuit in Doe, would frustrate
Congressional intent.87 In the wake of this past year, clear discrepancies
amongst the Circuits have arisen with regard to whether or not the ADA
is applicable to the practices of insurance companies.8
84. Pallozzi v. Allstate Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 31 (2nd Cir. 1999) (although the
case is factually dissimilar, arguably the ruling would extend to Doe-like
situations). Pallozzi also ruled on another issue presented in Doe, see infra notes
167-174 and accompanying text.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994).
86. Pallozzi, 198 F.3d at 32.
87. Id.
88. In the past twelve months six of the twelve circuits have ruled on this
issue. See Pallozzi, 198 F.3d 28, 31 (2"d Cir. 1999); Doe, 179 F.3d 557, 558 (7th Cir.
1999); Lewis v. Kmart Corp., 180 F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 1999) (the court rejected an
ADA Title I challenge to an insurance policy distinction in long-term disability
plans: two years for mental disabilities and benefits to age sixty-five for physical
disabilities); Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir.
2000) (upholding insurance distinctions in the face of ADA challenges); Ford v.
Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601 (3rd Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 850
(1999) (ruling that a disparity between disability benefits for mental and physical
disabilities does not violate the ADA); Kimber v. Thiokol Corp., 196 F.3d 1092
(10th Cir. 1999) (holding the ADA does not prohibit different benefit levels for
physical and mental disabilities). Only the first case cited ruled that the ADA
does regulate the underwriting practices of insurance companies. While the latter
five ruled the opposite, it is distinguishable that each of the latter five cases, like
Parker, dealt with insurance as a benefit of employment.
20001
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II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT - REVERSIBLE ERROR OR GOOD LAW?
A discrepancy exists between the majority and dissenting opinion in
Doe as to what question the court was being asked to answer. The
majority framed the issue as whether or not the federal courts may
regulate the content of insurance policies, a task strictly prohibited by
other federal legislation. 9 The dissent construed the question as whether
an insurer can discriminate against people with AIDS by refusing to pay
the same expenses it would pay if they did not have AIDS.90
In his powerful dissent, Judge Evans recognized that the stark
discrimination against policyholders with AIDS was based on several
premises. Namely, both parties stipulated that the same suffering, such as
pneumonia, may be both AIDS-related and non-AIDS-related, and in
such cases, coverage depends solely on whether or not the patient was
diagnosed with AIDS." In addition, Judge Evans discussed the sound
goals the ADA was intended to achieve. Employing language directly
from the statute itself, he observed that the discrimination exhibited by
Mutual of Omaha was precisely the type the ADA was designed to
eradicate.9
The majority opinion analogized the insurance company to a camera
store that would be forced to carry cameras specially designed for disabled
clientele.93 Further buttressing its decision, the majority definitively stated
that the ADA mandates no such burdens be placed on a proprietor.94 The
dissent, while agreeing that the ADA makes no such mandates on a
proprietor, countered that a more accurate analogy would be to liken the
insurance company to a camera store which allows disabled customers in
the door, but then refuses to sell them anything but inferior cameras.95
Under this analogy the protection of the ADA would be incited to bat the
bigoted behavior of Mutual of Omaha from offering inferior coverage to
AIDS patients or a camera store that sold disabled customers inferior
products.
The district court opinion in Doe was not only more thorough with
89. Doe, 179 F.3d at 565.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. (The ADA is supposed to signal a "clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities"
see 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). Judge Evans proceeded to say that he would use the
statute to right the wrong committed by Mutual of Omaha.) See 179 F.3d at 566.
93. Id. at 560.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 565.
Doe v. Mutual of Omaha
respect to the discrimination issue, but was also better supported by
authority. The court began by addressing Doe and Smith's allegation that
Mutual of Omaha's policy caps on AIDS and ARC benefits violate Title
III of the ADA. The court immediately examined the statutory language
of Title ili, quoting: "No individual shall be discriminated against on the
basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommoda'tion.. ."96 After looking to the statutory language, the court
articulated each party's proposed interpretation of the language. 97 Mutual
of Omaha maintained that the language of the statute polices only access
to goods and services offered by places of public accommodation, rather
than the content of the goods and services themselves." The fact that the
plaintiffs unquestionably enjoyed access to insurance policies from Mutual
of Omaha, through the company, was dispositive of the plaintiffs' claim
failing."
The court then entertained Doe and Smith's interpretation of the ADA
as well as the intended scope of Title III.° According to the plaintiffs,
Mutual of Omaha's reading of the statute renders the requirements of §
302(a) 101 of the ADA hollow.1 2 The statute mandates that disabled
persons be afforded the "full and equal enjoyment of facilities, goods,
services, privileges, or advantages of public accommodations."' 10 3  In
accordance with Doe and Smith's reading of the statute, full and equal
enjoyment of facilities, goods, services, privileges or advantages of public
accommodation can be gained only after access; that is, access is only the
starting point. 1'4 In essence, Doe and Smith's argument that "mere
access" is not enough finds its basis in the fact that under any other
interpretation the words "full" and "equal" would be meaningless.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (a) (1994).
97. Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 999 F. Supp. 1188, 1191 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. "No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in
the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any
person who owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation." 42
U.S.C. §§ 12181 - 12189 (1994).
102. Doe, 999 F. Supp. at 1191.
103. Id. at 1191 (quoting § 302(a)). Insurance offices are included in Title III's
list of "private entities [that] are considered public accommodation" 42 U.S.C. §
12181 (7)(F) (1994).
104. See Doe, 999 F. Supp. at 1191.
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Mutual of Omaha's contention that the plaintiffs' claim fails because an
insurance company is merely required to allow Doe and Smith access to
an insurance policy issued by their company is as distressing as it is
tenuous. It is akin to arguing that a five story building owner satisfies the
requirements of the ADA by providing a wheelchair ramp to the front
door, while the only way to get to floors two through five is by stairs.
Mutual of Omaha's assertion that so long as they have provided their
customers with equal access to their policies they are free to discriminate
on groundless and arbitrary bases is violative of the ADA. Doe and
Smith further explored the statutory language to secure additional support
for their interpretation. Section 302(b) of Title III states in pertinent part:
It shall be discriminatory to afford an individual or class of
individuals, on the basis of a disability or disabilities of such
individuals or class.., with the opportunity to participate in or
benefit from a good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or
accommodation that is not equal to that afforded to other
individuals."'
It is this language the plaintiffs relied on to try to negate Mutual of
Omaha's interpretation of the statute.0 6 The district agreed Doe and
Smith's interpretation was the appropriate one to be applied.17
A. Department of Justice - Deserving of Deference or Contempt?
In both the district court proceedings and the appeal to the Seventh
Circuit, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed amicus briefs1°8 and shared
Doe and Smith's interpretation of Title III of the ADA. ' 9 Each court
addressed the DOJ's interest in the case at bar and the deference the DOJ
deserves in matters in which it chooses to become involved. Ultimately,
however, each court treated the issue uniquely.
The district court opinion addressed the DOJ's involvement on two
separate grounds: (1) the Department's involvement in the case by way of
its filed amicus brief, and (2) the Department's Technical Assistance
Manual (Manual) issued to offer guidance to courts interpreting the
ADA. The DOJ's policy is to file amicus briefs in selected ADA cases
105. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii) (1994).
106. Doe, 999 F. Supp. at 1192.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1190; see also Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557 (7th
Cir. 1999).
109. Doe, 999 F. Supp. at 1192, n.4; see also Doe, 179 F.3d at 563.
110. Doe, 999 F. Supp. at 1194.
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in order to guide courts in interpreting the statute."'
The DOJ's involvement stems from its congressionally delegated power
to promulgate binding regulations concerning the ADA' 2 and to fashion a
Manual providing guidance concerning the requirements of the ADA."3
The Manual presents the ADA's Title III requirements in a format that
will be useful to the widest possible audience." 4 The guidance provided in
the Department's regulations and accompanying preambles has been
carefully reorganized to provide a focused, systematic description of the
ADA's requirements."5
The district court gave the DOJ great deference in accordance with
Supreme Court mandate." 6 In a 1984 decision, the Court stated that DOJ
regulations, due to the express delegation of authority from Congress,
must be given "legislative and hence controlling weight, unless they are
arbitrary, capricious, or plainly contrary to the statute.""7 This type of
deference has been termed Chevron deference, after the landmark case
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc."8
The Supreme Court formulated a two-step test to govern what
deference, if any, a court should accord an agency's interpretation of a
statute." 9 Step one requires the court to inquire, employing traditional
tools of statutory construction, 2 ' "[whether] Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue.''. In the event that Congress has in fact
spoken pointedly to the "question at issue," the court must "give effect to
,122the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." If, conversely, the
determination of the court is that "the statute is silent or ambiguous with
111. Enforcing the ADA: A Status Report from the Department of Justice,
(January - March 1999) at www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/janmar99.htm (last visited Nov.
1,1999).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b) (1994).
113. 42 U.S.C. § 12206(c)(3) (1994).
114. Americans with Disabilities Act: ADA Title III Technical Assistance
Manual available at http://www.usdoj/crt/ada/taman3/htm (last visited Feb. 21,
2000).
115. Id. The Manual attempts to avoid an overly legalistic style without
sacrificing completeness. In order to promote readability and understanding, the
text makes liberal use of questions and answers and illustrations.
116. See generally Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
117. United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 834 (1984).
118. See generally Chevron, 467 U.S. 837.
119. Id. at 842-44.
120. Id. at 843.
121. Id. at 842.
122. Id.
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respect to the specific issue," the court must advance its analysis to step
two of the test.12 The second step requires the interpreting court to defer
to "any reasonable interpretation" made by the agency."'
The Supreme Court articulated the two standards by which
administrative agencies are given deference. "If Congress has explicitly
left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority
to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation." '25 In an explicit situation, the agency's regulations are to be
given controlling weight."' In situations where the legislative delegation
to an agency is implicit, the Supreme Court stated that "a court may not
substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable
interpretation made by the.., agency."
127
The Doe district court not only looked for guidance from the DOJS128
regulations and Manual, but also gave the agency Chevron deference.
In the DOJ regulations, the agency concluded that the scope of the ADA
covers "insurance practices by prohibiting differential treatment of
individuals with disabilities in insurance offered by public
accommodations unless the differences are justified." '129 The court also
took into consideration the DOJ Manual which states in pertinent part
"insurance offices are places of public accommodation and, as such, may
not discriminate on the basis of disability in the sale of insurance contracts
or in the terms or conditions of the insurance contracts they offer."3 The
district court, like the DOJ, concluded that the ADA has consistently
been applied to insurance policies."'
Upon further appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reached
quite the opposite conclusion of that reached by the DOJ and the district
court. The Court of Appeals neatly skirted the issue by disagreeing with
the DOJ and its purported authority to promulgate regulations and
assistance manuals. The majority opinion cited Seventh Circuit
123. Id. at 843; see generally, A Pragmatic Approach to Chevron, 112 HARV.
L. REV. 1723 (1999).
124. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 999 F. Supp. 1188, 1194 (N.D. Ill.
1998).
129. 28 C.F.R. ch.1, pt. 36, App. B at 619 (1996).
130. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, The Americans with
Disabilities Act: Title III Technical Assistance Manual § 111-3.11000 (Nov. 1993).
131. Doe, 999 F. Supp. at 1194.
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precedent12 noting that it is unsettled how much Chevron deference
should be given to an agency's informal policy pronouncements.133 The
court also expressed its hesitation to show deference to both the DOJ's
amicus brief T1 and to the Manual. The majority opinion held that an
agency's amicus brief cannot be entitled to great deference "when it is the
brief of an agency that has, and has exercised, rulemaking powers yet has
unaccountably failed to address a fundamental issue on which the brief
takes a radical stance. 136 According to the Seventh Circuit, the DOJ
displaced the regulation of the insurance industry to the federal courts,"'
whereas traditionally the insurance industry has been an organ of the
state. The court makes little mention of the assistance manual or the
regulations, and instead focuses on the amicus brief. While the amicus
briefs of administrative agencies certainly command deference, the
assistance Manual and regulations promulgated by Congress itself
seemingly would be entitled to a higher level of respect and observance.
The court observed that a brief on behalf of one of the parties can hardly
be hailed for its "democratic legitimacy" over Congress' intent to exclude
insurance companies from the purview of the ADA. 1 9 The Seventh
Circuit vilified the issue overall stating, "the common sense of the statute
is that the content of the goods or services offered by a place of public
accommodation is not regulated."' 40 This simplistic interpretation of the
ADA is one that not all courts share.
B. Safe Harbor
Section 501(c) of Title IV of the ADA has been termed the "safe
harbor" provision. l 2 The section states "subchapters I through III of this
chapter and Title IV of this Act shall not be construed to prohibit or
132. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Vega, 174 F.3d 870, 874-75 (7th Cir. 1999).
133. Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 563 (7th Cir. 1999).
134. Id.; The court noted in its opinion that the Supreme Court ruled the
agency's amicus brief is entitled to some deference. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S.
452, 462 (1997).
135. Doe, 179 F.3d at 563.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Doe, 179 F.3d at 562-63.
139. Id. at 563.
140. Id. at 560.
141. See generally World Ins. Co. v. Branch, 966 F. Supp. 1203 (N.D. Ga.
1997); see also Chabner v. United Mutual of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 944 F. Supp.
1185 (N.D. Cal. 1998); Pallozzi v. Allstate Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 31 (2nd Cir. 1999).
142. Doe, 179 F.3d at 562.
2000]
198 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 17:181
restrict an insurer ... from underwriting risks, classifying risks, or
administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State
law .... 1 43 However, the statute maintains that § 501(c) shall not be used
by an insurance company as a subterfuge to evade the purposes of
subchapter I and III.'4 Mutual of Omaha, as might be expected of any
insurance company, argued § 501(c) establishes a rule of construction,
exhibiting Congress' intent to prohibit any interpretation of Title III that
would impose an affirmative obligation on insurance companies to design
policies in a certain way. 14' Doe and Smith argued that the inclusion of §
501(c) only buttresses the conclusion that Title III reaches the policies of
insurance companies. 46 Section 501(c) will be construed as a safe harbor
provision for insurance companies only if their practices are in accord with
"sound actuarial principles, reasonably anticipated experience, or bona
fide risk classification."'47 If an insurance company evades the purposes of
the ADA it will fall outside the protections of the "safe harbor"
. • 148
provision.
Section 501(c), as interpreted by the district court in Doe, does not
signal Congress' intent to broadly exempt insurance companies from the
reach of Title 111.149 Rather, the court construed § 501(c)'s "safe harbor"
provision as a manifestation of Congress' intent to subject insurance
companies to the full scope of the ADA's anti-discrimination
prohibitions. The section acts as a protection for companies that
function in conformity with the law. The legislative history is clear:
insurers may continue to sell to and underwrite individuals applying for
life, health or other insurance, so long as the standards used are based on
sound actuarial data and not on speculation."'
The Seventh Circuit treated § 501(c) in a somewhat convoluted
143. 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (1994).
144. Id.
145. Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 999 F. Supp. 1188, 1195 (N.D. Ill.
1998).
146. Id.
147. World Ins. Co. v. Branch, 966 F. Supp. 1203, 1208-09 (N.D. Ga. 1997); see
also Doe, 999 F. Supp at 1195.
148. Worlds Ins. Co., 966 F. Supp. at 1207.
149. Doe, 999 F. Supp. at 1195.
150. Id. (Furthermore, one House Report explains that the ADA assures that
decisions concerning the insurance of persons with disabilities which are not based
on bona fide risk classification be made in conformity with non-discrimination
requirements. H.R. Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 137-38 and pt. 3
at 70 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 303,445).
151. H.R. Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 137-38 and pt. 3 at 70
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 303,445).
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manner. The court inferred from § 501(c) that § 302(a) forbids an insurer
from turning down an applicant merely because he/she is disabled.52
Because the Seventh Circuit did not recognize Title III as extending to the
content of insurance policies, it likewise, did not recognize the application
of § 501(c). The court joined the § 501(c) analysis to the application of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act."' The step-by-step analysis of the court is as
follows: if the court were to recognize the protections of the ADA as
applicable to the content of insurance companies, the insurance company
would only be able to justify its seemingly discriminatory actions, such as
caps, by invoking the protections of the safe harbor provision. The
coupling of the § 501(c) analysis with the application of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act appears in the court's conclusion that if a judicial body was
called upon to determine the correct application of the safe harbor
provision, it would inevitably be regulating the health insurance industry.
Regulation of the health insurance industry has been strictly the province
of the states and the McCarran-Ferguson Act, ostensibly, prohibits courts
from engaging in such regulation. If the ADA were fully applicable to
insurance companies, which the Seventh Circuit ruled it is not, Mutual of
Omaha would have had to defend its AIDS caps by reference to §
501(c).'54 If the company could have proven that its implementation of
AIDS caps were in accord with sound actuarial principles, the company
would have been protected by the safe harbor provision of Title IV. In
the opinion of the Seventh Circuit, the application of § 501(c) would have
placed the court in a position to regulate the health insurance industry, a
practice the McCarran-Ferguson Act prohibits.' By the very plain
language of the statutory construction, it would seem obvious that there
would be no need for the "safe harbor" provision unless Title III applied
to the content of insurance policies.156
The Seventh Circuit backed itself into a corner. Without recognizing
that Title III applies to the content of insurance policies, the "safe harbor"
provision could never come into play. In order to attach importance to §
501(c), it could be said that it is a prerequisite to acknowledge Title III's
application to the content of insurance policies. Worthy of mention is the
fact that "Mutual of Omaha has stipulated that it has not shown and
152. Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 564 (7th Cir. 1999).
153. 179 F.3d at 564; see also infra Subsection C; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).
154. Doe, 179 F.3d at 564.
155. Id.
156. Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 999 F. Supp. 1188, 1190-91 (N.D. Ill.
1998) (the safe harbor provision of the ADA for insurers would be rendered
meaningless if the court did not hold that Title III applied to insurance
underwriting practices.)
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cannot show that its AIDS caps are or ever have been consistent with
sound actuarial principles, actual or reasonably anticipated experience,
bona fide risk classification, or state law. 157 According to the dissent and
the district court opinion, by its concession, Mutual of Omaha disqualified
• • 158
itself from the protection of the "safe harbor" provision. These
opinions concluded that without sound actuarial basis for its caps (and
thus no "safe harbor" to take shelter in), Mutual of Omaha engaged in
discriminatory practices violative of the ADA. The Seventh Circuit, by
resorting to the McCarran-Ferguson Act, eliminates the need for this
analysis."' Having so said, the Seventh Circuit seemingly implied that the
"safe harbor" provision of the ADA and the McCarran-Ferguson Act are
at odds with one another.
C. The McCarran-Ferguson Act - Applicable to the ADA?
The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides in pertinent part "no Act of
Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law
enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance.. .unless such Act specifically relates to the business of
insurance.""6 In determining whether the Act relates to the business of
insurance, a court must ask whether the ADA contains sufficient specific
references to the insurance industry.' This question can be best
answered by looking to the language of the statute itself. Section 501(c)
explicitly provides that insurance underwriting practices shall not be used
to evade the purposes of Title IlI."' The title and language of § 501(c),
coupled with the reference to "insurance office"' 63 in Title III, yields a
statute that "specifically relates to the business of insurance" for the
purposes of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.'64 Additionally, so as not to
trigger the application of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, Title III must be
proven not to "invalidate, impair, or supersede"'' 65 any state law.1
66
According to the Seventh Circuit, to trigger the prohibition of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, the interpretation of the statute need only
157. Doe, 179 F.3d at 558.
158. Id. at 565.
159. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012 et seq. (2000).
160. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).
161. Doe, 999 F. Supp. at 1195.
162. Id.
163. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(f) (1994).
164. Doe, 999 F. Supp. at 1195 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1994)).
165. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).
166. Doe, 999 F. Supp. at 1195.
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"interfere with a State's administrative regime. 167
The Second Circuit recently handed down an opinion reaching an
opposite conclusion than that reached by the Seventh.16 The Second
Circuit court resolved that the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not bar the
application of Title III to the insurance industry. 169 The court followed a
four-step analysis articulated by the Supreme Court in Barnett Bank v.
Nelson.7 ' First, a reviewing court must determine that the statute in
171question relates to the insurance business. Second, the statute must be
deemed to "specifically" relate to the insurance business."' Third, it must
be established whether the statute specifically relates to the "business of
insurance"."' Fourth, a reviewing court must consider the statute in light
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act's purposes, placing emphasis on the fact
that the Act was promulgated to "protect state [insurance] regulation
primarily against inadvertent federal intrusion.' ' 74 Applying each step to
the ADA, the Second Circuit concluded "the ADA clearly relates to the
insurance business, insofar as Title III defines an 'insurance office' as a
place of 'public accommodation',.., and § 501(c), which is labeled
'Insurance,' subjects insurance underwriting to the regulatory scope of the
ADA under specified circumstances. 1 75 The court further concluded that
decisions granting or denying insurance to disabled persons are
sufficiently within the "business of insurance" to satisfy the third step of
the Barnett Bank analysis."' Finally, the Second Circuit stated that the
specific references to the insurance industry in the ADA, as stated and
discussed above, are evidence that "any intrusion by the ADA on state
insurance regulation was not 'inadvertent.'
1 7
The Barnett Bank Court further explained that neither the McCarran-
Ferguson Act's language nor purpose requires that the federal statute in
167. Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 563, citing Humana Inc.
v. Forsyth, 119 S. Ct. 710, 717 (1999).
168. See Pallozzi v. Allstate Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28 (2nd Cir. 1999).
169. Id. at 35. Although the facts are distinguishable, the ruling with respect
to the applicability of the McCarran-Ferguson Act would be applicable to a factual
situation similar to Doe.
170. 517 U.S. 25 (1996).
171. Id. at 38.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 39.
174. Id.
175. Pallozzi v. Allstate Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 34 (2nd Cir. 1999).
176. Id. at 35.
177. Id. (citing Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 39).
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question predominantly relate to insurance.18 Conversely, the Barnett
Court pointed out, "specific detailed references to the insurance industry
in proposed legislation normally will achieve the McCarran-Ferguson
Act's objectives."'' 79 According to the Supreme Court, Congress will call
the proposed legislation to the attention of the interested parties, and
subsequently will guarantee normally, should the proposal become law,
that Congress will have focused upon its insurance-related effects.' 80
The majority opinion of the Seventh Circuit questionably concluded
that if Title III were interpreted to include the practices of insurance
companies, a state's administrative regime would be disturbed.""' Federal
courts would then be charged with the task of determining whether caps
on disabling conditions are actuarially sound and consistent with
principles of state law. According to the court, this would essentially
displace the authority given to state insurance commissioners.'9 The
McCarran-Ferguson Act does not bar the application of the ADA to the
insurance industry. The ADA can be judged to be sufficiently related to
the business of insurance so as not to invoke the bar of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act. The Seventh Circuit ultimately concluded Title III does
not require a seller to alter his product to make it equally valuable to the
disabled and to the non-disabled.'83 The majority opinion held that if the
conclusion reached by the court is wrong, "the suit must fail anyway,
because it is barred by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. ' ' '84 Essentially, the
Seventh Circuit reasoned that the suit would fail under any analysis it
entertained.""
The court did offer Doe and Smith an alternative method of recovery.
According to the panel, if the AIDS caps in Mutual of Omaha's policies
were not consistent with state law and sound actuarial practices, Doe and
Smith could have obtained all the relief to which they were entitled from
the state commissioners who regulate the insurance business.' 8 The court
even noted that Mutual of Omaha could be bound by its stipulation that it
did not and could not show its AIDS caps were consistent with sound
178. Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 41.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 563-64 (7th Cir.
1999).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 563.
184. Id.
185. See id. at 557.
186. Id. at 565.
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principles, bona fide risk classifications, or state law."' The Seventh
Circuit, however, adamantly stated that the regulation of the insurance
industry does not properly lie within the province of the federal court
system.' 88
CONCLUSION
In Doe v. Mutual of Omaha the Seventh Circuit committed reversible
error. The court made an unfounded ruling on statutory interpretation189
inconsistent with the legislative intent of Congress, the Department of
Justice regulations,'9 the Technical Assistance Manual' 9' and the amicus
curiae brief.'9 Indeed, Doe is inconsistent with the very raison d'etre of
the ADA.' 9' As case law demonstrates, the ADA is applicable to the
content of insurance policies when the policy is issued to the holderS • 194
directly by the insurance company, the place of public accommodation.
The proper interpretation of the ADA with respect to the insurance
industry would be to allow the provisions of the anti-discrimination
statute to apply to the industry as it applies to all other similarly situated
entities. An insurance company would be permitted to invoke the
protection of the "safe harbor" provision of the statute provided the
company has acted within the reasonable confines set out by the statute.
The ADA can be amply construed to be related to the business of
insurance so as to clear the bar that would be invoked by the application
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Finally, invoking the ADA does not
frustrate any state law. Although the Seventh Circuit claims Title III need
187. Id.
188. id.
189. See Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 999 F. Supp. 1188, 1193 (N.D. I11.
1998) (The legislative history of the ADA confirms the applicability of Title III to
the substance of insurance policies); see also H.R. Rep. No.101-485, pt.2, at 136-37
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 419-20 (an insurance plan may not
refuse to insure, or refuse to continue to insure, or limit the amount, extent, or
kind of coverage available to an individual, or charge a different rate for the same
coverage solely because of a physical or mental impairment).
190. 28 C.F.R. ch.1, pt. 36, App. B at 619 (1996).
191. See Americans with Disabilities Act: ADA Title III Technical Assistance
Manual § 111-3.11000 (Nov. 1993).
192. Doe, 999 F. Supp. at 1192.
193. See generally, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (1994).
194. See generally Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 999 F.3d 181 (6th Cir.
1996); Leonard F. v. Israel Discount Bank of New York, 967 F. Supp. 802
(S.D.N.Y. 1997); Chabner v. United Mutual of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 994 F. Supp.
1185 (N.D. Cal. 1998); World Ins. Co. v. Branch, 966 F. Supp. 1203 (N.D. Ga.
1997).
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only "interfere with a State's administrative regime," for the McCarran-
Ferguson Act to be triggered; in fact the provision of the ADA must
"invalidate, impair, or supersede" a state law. Congressional intent has
been frustrated, the language of the statute is clear, and the threshold is
high. While the Supreme Court has declined to review the case, counsel
for Doe and Smith aptly stated "the Court did not give a green light to the
practice.... in declining to review, the Justices merely indicated they are
not ready to rule at this time." '195
195. U.S. Supreme Court Declines to Hear HIV Insurance Caps Case, at
http://www.lambda.org (last visited Feb. 8, 2000).
